The main argument that HIV/AIDS threatens national security is founded in fears that HIV/AIDS will decimate individuals critical to the maintenance of state and international security, for example soldiers and peacekeepers.
In a UNAIDS point of view paper of May 1998 entitled "AIDS and the military", it was stated that military personnel have a high risk of exposure to HIV. That report indicated that HIV infection rates among armed forces were generally 2 to 5 times higher than in civilian populations, and warned that infections were much higher during times of conflict.
Studies in many countries have shown that soldiers have a higher risk of HIV infection than equivalent age groups in civilian populations. Female soldiers, like women elsewhere, are more vulnerable to HIV infection.
HIV/AIDS is severely affecting the armed forces of many African countries. Accurate data on prevalence of HIV among soldiers is difficult to obtain because such data are considered state secrets.
One African country declared that close to a third of her national force was infected with HIV. There is also a tendency towards higher rates of HIV prevalence in civilian communities situated near army barracks.
The impact of HIV/AIDS on militaries is not limited to Africa. In one Eastern European country, nine thousand potential recruits were rejected because of testing HIV positive. This country has rejected individuals who are HIV positive from military service since 2003.
Military drilling involves acceptance of risk. During combat, a soldier must be willing to take risks.
Such battle-field training that places value on aggressiveness makes many of our gallant men and women in uniform wanting to 'conquer' many sexual partners as a way to exhibit power and strength. This misplaced sense of risk-taking behaviour may have given rise to the saying: 'Soldiers never die, they just fade away'.
The good news is that a well-trained military presents a captive audience, and if well planned, may offer a unique window of hope for HIV/AIDS prevention. A well-trained and disciplined cadre of officers could be targeted as role models to offer counseling and peer-education.
Posting military officers far from their families for a long time has contributed to high infection rates. This is especially true during times of peace-keeping. United Nations and African Union peace-keepers often have more money than the local communities in which they serve-- this gives them the financial muscle to purchase sex.
Fears that peacekeepers spread HIV were voiced during allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These acts undermine trust in UN peacekeeping missions.
Countries in conflict may refuse peacekeepers from countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence. Indeed, the Khartoum government demanded that African Union peacekeepers entering Sudan must be HIV negative. In 2001, Eritrea also demanded that peacekeepers that were HIV positive should not be deployed on the border with Ethiopia.
Countries with high HIV prevalence will find it difficult to send their soldiers for peacekeeping. This, obviously, means loss of foreign exchange for the soldiers themselves and the government.
Trained soldiers are difficult and expensive to replace. The loss of highly trained and rarely skilled professional soldiers to AIDS will have a major impact on affected armed forces.
Armies debilitated by AIDS will tend to be weak, and will fail to defend their nations in times of armed conflict.
Armed forces with high HIV prevalence will incur huge costs to put soldiers on antiretroviral treatment.
This will make the military seek greater proportions of government subventions, making them less able to invest in modern equipment to protect national security.
Events of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror have made western countries rethink their strategic involvement to curb the epidemic. In order to safeguard western interests, there has been a renewed impetus to fund HIV prevention and treatment programs in African nations that are viewed as strategic. The thinking is that HIV should not be allowed to cripple the militaries of these strategic African nations lest they fail to defend themselves during armed conflicts, especially those involving strategic resources required by the west.
There is a security justification for the millions of bilateral donor funds being poured into HIV/AIDS programs in Africa. If you have a strategic resource of interest to the west, you will get money for HIV treatment. If you don't have a strategic resource, sorry, you must dig into your own government coffers.
The other security justification to receiving funding for HIV/AIDS programs stems from the so-called 'failed states'. In failed states, high levels of HIV/AIDS could trigger more discontent and fatalism-- precursors for international terrorism. Other security fears are that HIV could be used as a bioweapon by sadists under the influence of the 'axis of evil'.
In order to secure the security of African states, governments must ensure that military and police personnel are drilled in issues of HIV/AIDS.
l Kazhila Chinsembu is a lecturer at the University of Namibia. Email comments to kchinsembu@unam.na
